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Trends in Communist Propaganda

29 Jan 75

**Confidential**



# **TRENDS**

**In Communist Propaganda**

**Confidential**

29 JANUARY 1975  
(VOL. XXVI, NO. 4)

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## INDOCHINA

The anniversary of the 27 January 1973 Paris peace agreement and President Ford's 21 January press conference remarks on Vietnam occasioned an outpouring of Vietnamese communist authoritative statements and press and radio comment. Both the DRV and the PRG denounced alleged U.S.-Saigon violations of the peace accord and set forth communist terms for its implementation. At the same time, an article in the party daily NHAN DAN under the authoritative byline "Commentator" has offered Hanoi's first reaction to recent speculation in the Western press on a possible new U.S.-GVN peace initiative. Commentator derided the rumored initiative and, like other comment, insisted that the United States must end its assistance to the GVN and that President Thieu must be removed and a new Saigon government formed.

The Vietnamese communists marked the Paris agreement anniversary much as they did last year, with comment from Le Duc Tho, chief negotiator on the Paris accords, a Hanoi meeting addressed by former delegate to the Paris talks Xuan Thuy, and the release of a PRG "White Book" on the implementation of the accord. Unlike last year, there were no government statements on the anniversary by the DRV and the PRG, but Hanoi did publicize a DRV Foreign Ministry memorandum on the occasion sent to the Soviet Union, China, and other parties to the March 1973 international accord on Vietnam and members of the ICCS. Moscow media marked the anniversary with a spate of low-level comment similar to that of last year; there was less Peking attention to the anniversary than in 1974.

## DRV SCORES FORD PRESS CONFERENCE, REPORTS OF GVN PEACE PLAN

RESPONSE TO FORD PRESS CONFERENCE	Hanoi's initial authoritative reaction to President Ford's press conference on the 21st came in a statement by the DRV Foreign Ministry spokesman on the following day which denied the President's "slandorous" accusations about North Vietnamese violations of the peace agreement and assailed his request for increased military assistance for Saigon and Phnom Penh. Alluding to questions asked the President about the possibility of future U.S. military involvement in Vietnam, the spokesman also accused the President of "making equivocal statements intended to threaten military action against the Vietnamese people." A PRG Foreign Ministry spokesman's statement on the same day was more specific, charging that President Ford had
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"left open the possibility of using U.S. air and naval forces to attack Vietnam," and commenting that "the U.S. deterrent policy has proved and is proving to be obsolete."

The President was harshly criticized on the 23d in an article in the party paper NHAN DAN by Tran Kien--a regular commentator who has been previously identified as a member of the paper's editorial board. Tran Kien accused the President of "lying" about events in South Vietnam, "cooking up the story that North Vietnam had infiltrated military personnel and weapons into the South and violated the Paris agreement," and "completely ignoring the blatant actions" of the United States and "its henchmen." He also criticized President Ford for failing to mention "the obligations and responsibilities of his country" as defined in the Paris agreement, and for making statements which conflict with the agreement's requirement that the United States respect the independence, sovereignty, unity, and territorial integrity of Vietnam and end its military involvement there.

Tran Kien not only held that the President's appeal for more assistance violated the Paris agreement, but that it was "a betrayal of the U.S. Administration's commitments to the American people two years ago" and a "challenge to many U.S. congressman who are eager to end U.S. involvement in Indochina." Adopting the usual circumspect DRV stance, he did not directly assess the likely disposition of the President's request for an additional \$300 million in military aid, but noted that the situation in the United States "is not what it used to be" and cited statements by Congressional opponents to the request.

Secretary of State Kissinger's 28 January press conference remarks defending the Administration request for increased assistance prompted a response on the following day in a statement by the PRG Foreign Ministry spokesman. The spokesman charged that the Ford Administration was attempting to deceive public opinion and pressure the Congress and maintained that any amount of U.S. aid only aggravated the situation in South Vietnam and constituted a violation of the peace agreement.

<p>NHAN DAN "COMMENTATOR" ON GVN PEACE INITIATIVE</p>	<p>The Commentator article in the 24 January NHAN DAN after brief standard criticism of U.S. policies focused on recent Western press speculation that a new GVN initiative might soon result in a return to the negotiating table. Commentator specifically cited Robert Shaplen's article in the 6 January NEW YORKER magazine, claiming that the article was part of Washington's "'good will for</p>
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peace' campaign." While rejecting the proposed GVN initiative to the communists outlined by Shaplen, Commentator did not mention his speculation that the communists might give up their demand for Thieu's removal as a condition for negotiations if he made a good enough offer to them. Thus, while repeating conventional communist demands, the article did leave open the possibility of some flexibility in reaching a settlement.

Commentator reported that Shaplen said that Thieu would advance an initiative offering a determination of zones of control, the establishment of the National Council for National Reconciliation, and the convening of a constituent assembly to draft a constitution. Deriding the proposal as an "unrealistic peace advertising farce," the paper charged that it offered nothing more than what was already promised in the Paris agreement. Like other Vietnamese communist media comment, Commentator returned to the demands of the PRG's 8 October 1974 Government statement, declaring that the United States must end involvement in Vietnam and aid for Saigon and that "Thieu and his clique" must be toppled and a new administration established in Saigon to implement the peace agreement.

BACKGROUND: The latest Commentator article is his third in less than two weeks and appears to reflect a North Vietnamese decision to resume the regular use of this vehicle on major foreign policy issues. During the war years, NHAN DAN Commentator articles were consistently used to set forth Hanoi's views on major U.S. policies and Presidential pronouncements.

There is no sufficient evidence to definitely determine whether Commentator's eclipse in the post-agreement period was the result of the diminished position of a faction in the DRV leadership. His eight articles in the past two years, including the current ones, have generally continued to focus on significant issues and to have a tone of authority not found in other Hanoi media comment. It is notable, for example, that the first two post-agreement Commentator articles--on 7 April and 8 December 1973--dealt with U.S. policies and shortly preceded the resumption of consultations between Secretary Kissinger and Le Duc Tho. Two other Commentator articles appeared in June 1974, and he has twice written on Thailand--on 5 December 1974 and 14 January 1975--since Hanoi's new initiative toward Bangkok in DRV Foreign Minister Nguyen Duy Trinh's 27 November letter to the Thai Foreign Minister. The last

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previous Commentator article, on 16 January, criticized U.S. policies toward Vietnam reflected in statements by Administration officials and the State Department's 11 January note to signatories of the international accord on Vietnam.\*

# PARIS AGREEMENT ANNIVERSARY MARKED BY HANOI AND ITS ALLIES

DRV MEMORANDUM      The 27 January DRV Foreign Ministry memorandum on the Paris agreement anniversary, publicized on the 29th, went to great lengths to demonstrate that the communists have been forthcoming in seeking a Vietnam solution, but it still returned to the conventional communist demands. Focusing its criticism on the United States, the memorandum charged that "systematic violation and sabotage" of the agreement by the United States was the "salient feature" of the Vietnam situation, and that U.S. "military involvement and interference in the internal affairs of South Vietnam, as well as of other countries in Indochina, are the main danger threatening peace and security of the nations in the area."

Documenting its denial of U.S. charges that the communists have turned from the path of negotiations, the memorandum cited DRV consultations leading to the 13 June 1973 joint communique with the United States and other parties and the PRG's alleged cooperation in forums with the GVN, adding the unusual claim that: "Throughout the past two years, the path of contacts and talks has remained wide open, but the U.S. Government has done nothing but to sabotage the Paris agreement with increasing impudence." According to the memorandum, communists attacks in South Vietnam are not only meant to "punish" GVN "acts of war" but also to "compel the other side" to implement the agreement.

The memorandum outlined the basic communist demands for a settlement with North Vietnam, as well as in the South. In the South, it asserted, there must be a complete end to U.S. involvement and a withdrawal of U.S. "military personnel," along with the overthrow of "Nguyen Van Thieu and his group," and the establishment of a new administration in Saigon which will implement the Paris agreement and negotiate a settlement with the PRG. According to

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\* Previous articles by the NHAN DAN Commentator are discussed in the TRENDS of 22 January 1975, pages 19-20; 15 January 1975, pages 13-14; 26 June 1974, pages 12-14; 12 June 1974, pages 16-18; 12 December 1973, pages 9-10; and 11 April 1973, pages 5-7.

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the memorandum, the DRV demands that the United States end encroachments on North Vietnamese sovereignty and territory, "fulfill its obligations" regarding DRV reconstruction, and implement Article 20 of the Paris agreement on Laos and Cambodia.

HANOI MEETING      The 27 January Hanoi meeting on the agreement anniversary heard an opening speech by Politburo member and Foreign Minister Nguyen Duy Trinh, the highest level official in attendance, and a main address by Secretariat member Xuan Thuy, former delegate to the peace talks in Paris who had similarly addressed the anniversary meeting in 1974. Reaffirming the communists' evaluation of the Paris agreement as a "great victory," Xuan Thuy reasoned that there is no reason for them to violate it and undermine their own success. In addition to listing the usual charges of alleged violations by the United States and the GVN, Xuan Thuy assailed them for "threatening that if counterattacks are made a big war will break out." He pledged that "we are ready to resist any war of aggression, be it small or big, wherever it may come from. We are not frightened by threats." Xuan Thuy offered the United States a choice of two courses, indicating that if it wishes to avoid the route of war it should implement the Paris agreement in line with the PRG's 8 October statement and that it should stop reconnaissance over North Vietnam and fulfill its "obligation" to contribute to DRV reconstruction.

LE DUC THO REMARKS      Hanoi radio on 26 January broadcast a summary of a television talk that day by Politburo member Le Duc Tho, his first statement on the Vietnam situation since an interview in the French Communist Party organ L'HUMANITE on 19 December, which VNA carried. The talk was similar to a television interview Tho gave last year on the occasion of the anniversary, but it reflected the exacerbation of Hanoi's relationship with the United States in the intervening period. Thus, unlike last year, Tho did not choose to specify that North Vietnam's goodwill had been demonstrated by his two meetings with Kissinger seeking to insure the implementation of the peace agreement; and he did not repeat the suggestion that U.S. actions could lead to the establishment of normal relations between the United States and North Vietnam.

Hanoi for the most part has avoided raising the questions of improving U.S.-DRV relations since a spate of media attention to it at the time of the 1974 anniversary of the Paris agreement; but Foreign Minister Nguyen Duy Trinh, in his 24 December report

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to the DRV National Assembly, did reiterate the theme that "a strict implementation of the Paris agreement by the United States will create conditions for establishing a new, equal, and mutually beneficial relationship" between the United States and the DRV.

Le Duc Tho also commented on the second anniversary of the Paris agreement in an interview in the Japanese Communist Party organ AKAHATA, publicized by Hanoi on 27 January. In the interview he repeated standard demands for U.S. implementation of the peace accord, but added a somber assessment of the situation. According to Tho, the experience of the past two years has led to the conclusion that:

. . . the United States and Thieu have never honored their commitments, that they signed the agreement--an agreement which they were forced to sign because of their defeats--only to discard it afterwards. So, the only way to make them honor the commitments they have made and do what they have undertaken to do is to struggle on with resolution and thwart all their schemes.

MOSCOW, PEKING COMMENT      Soviet media attention to the second anniversary of the Paris agreement generally followed the pattern set last year, with signed articles in PRAVDA, IZVESTIYA, and RED STAR and radio commentaries praising Vietnamese communist achievements and advocating a strict and full implementation of the accords. The RED STAR article by Colonel A. Leontyev was most critical of the U.S. role in Vietnam, scoring the attitude of the "Pentagon" and U.S. Ambassador Martin and citing Defense Secretary Schlesinger's 14 January press conference statements on the possibility of Congressional sanction for U.S. military action in response to a North Vietnamese offensive. The article commented on the Secretary's remarks: "It is hard to say for whom these threats are intended. It is clear, however, that they can only complicate the situation in Vietnam." The PRAVDA article was much more circumspect, noting U.S. aid for Thieu but carefully avoiding any reference to the United States in describing the PRG's proposals as calling for the withdrawal of "foreign troops" from South Vietnam and "other practical measures" to implement the peace agreement. (Moscow media are not known to have mentioned President Ford's remarks on Vietnam in his 21 January press conference. TASS did promptly report the President's 28 January message to Congress requesting additional military assistance for Indochina.)

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Peking marked the second anniversary of the Paris accords with an NCNA correspondent's report on 28 January, maintaining a lower profile on the occasion than last year when there was a PEOPLE'S DAILY editorial. The correspondent's report reiterated Vietnamese communist charges that the Thieu clique has systematically violated the Paris agreements with the support of the "U.S. government" and that future acts of sabotage of the agreements would continue to meet defensive counterattack from the army and people in the liberated areas.

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#### DRV PARTY JOURNAL INDICATES CENTRAL COMMITTEE PLENUM HELD

The editorial in the January issue of the DRV party journal HOC TAP has indicated that the 23d plenum of the Central Committee of the Vietnam Workers Party (VWP) has been held. Information as to when it was convened or what was discussed was not disclosed in the 25 January radio excerpts of the editorial, and monitored DRV media have not made any further mention of it.

The editorial dealt mainly with economic tasks for 1975 and only in passing alluded to the plenum, when urging implementation of the "resolutions of the 21st, 22d, and 23d VWP Central Committee plenums," in connection with the upcoming celebrations of the 45th anniversary of the party, 85th anniversary of Ho Chi Minh's birth, and the 30th anniversary of the DRV. Failure of the editorial to provide further mention of the resolution of the 23d plenum in the context of its economic discussions--in contrast to its several citations of the 22d plenum resolution as authority for carrying out current economic tasks--suggests that economic issues were not significant at the 23d plenum. Likewise, publicized accounts of the fifth session of the Fourth National Assembly, which was convened at the end of December and which dealt extensively with economic matters, also failed to mention the new plenum, although the resolution of the 22d plenum received the usual frequent attention.

The editorial's citing of the rarely mentioned 21st plenum is also notable. DRV media have rarely referred to the 21st plenum, and then usually as a passing reference in discussions of military affairs. Linking it in the editorial with the first public mention of the 23d plenum may indicate that both forums dealt with matters of similar interest. DRV propaganda has been reticent to account for party plenums before. During the war years, the media made no mention of the 13th through the 18th plenums, presumably held between August 1965 and early 1971.

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## NEW CLANDESTINE RADIO BEAMS INSURGENTS' LINE TO PHNOM PENH

The Cambodian insurgents have stepped up their propaganda effort with the launching of a new clandestine radio calling itself the "Voice of the National United Front of Cambodia of Phnom Penh." The new station's programming is similar to that of the other insurgent radio, the "Voice of the National United Front of Cambodia (NUFC)," and the news agency AKI. Both the radio and news agency began transmitting in August 1970 with the announced purpose of supplying "genuine information" about the situation in Cambodia. Neither of these clandestine organs has mentioned the new "radio of Phnom Penh," but the Front radio on 13 January made a schedule change which, it now appears, was made to avoid overlapping of broadcasts with the new radio.

The new clandestine radio, which carries three half-hour programs daily, was first monitored by FBIS on 24 January. However, since no prior announcement was heard, it is not known when it first went on the air. It should be noted that the day before, on the 23d, an AFP item datelined Phnom Penh referred to a "secret" antigovernment transmitter in Cambodia.

To date the broadcast content of the new radio is consistent with the past clandestine transmissions. But no doubt the insurgents launched the new effort with the assumption that there would be greater psychological impact from a radio purporting to speak for the citizens of the Cambodian capital. The broadcast heard on 24 January carried an appeal by insurgent leader Khieu Samphan (dated the 22d), and appeals from the other chief insurgent leaders inside Cambodia, Hou Youn and Hu Nim, on the 25th and 28th, respectively. The new radio has rebroadcast all these appeals and also has carried battle reports that are identical to reports carried by the news agency AKI.

The Khieu Samphan appeal has been repeated by AKI, but the Voice of the NUFC has not rebroadcast any of them. All three appeals are similar to a series issued by Khieu Samphan last October in anticipation of the dry season offensive. They conform to other authoritative Front statements about the current dry season offensive calling for intensified insurgent attacks but avoiding predictions of the imminent collapse of Phnom Penh defenses. The appeals have routinely reaffirmed uncompromising opposition to negotiations with Lon Nol, and have called for the complete overthrow of the Phnom Penh administration. Khieu Samphan warned foreign residents of Phnom Penh, including the diplomatic community, to evacuate the city, declaring that the Front would not bear responsibility for any injury sustained should foreigners choose to stay.

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## CPSU DELEGATION VISITS LAO "LIBERATED ZONE"

An 8-12 January "friendship" visit to Viengsay by a CPSU delegation led by Central Committee member Aleksey Shibayev marked the first high-level Soviet visit to the territory controlled by the Lao Patriotic Front. Shibayev's delegation was hosted by LPF Economic and Production Department Deputy Head and Central Committee member Maysouk Saisompheng, who also represented the LPF side at the joint talks held on the 9th. The Soviet delegation met with LPF Standing Committee members Nouhak Phoumsavan, Nilaavu Lobliayao, and Phoun Sipraseuth, but Pathet Lao accounts of the visit did not mention whether Shibayev also met with LPF Central Committee Vice Chairman Kayson Phomvihan, who has met with comparable delegations in the past.

In a 10 January speech at a Viengsay welcoming rally, Maysouk thanked the Soviet delegation for the support and assistance extended by the Soviet Union during the Lao national liberation struggle, using formulations similar in tone and warmth to those expressed during the last visit to the liberated zone by a party delegation from one of Moscow's allies, the 25-28 March 1974 visit by a SED Central Committee group led by Johannes Chemnitzer. Shibayev, in reply, assessed the situation in Laos and noted that the national liberation struggle was not over, but "continues in a new form." In what may have been an allusion to the strains between the Luang Prabang and Viengsay-based LPF leaders over policy issues in the National Political Council of Coalition led by LPF Chairman Souphanouvong, Shibayev urged them to "heighten your vigilance and maintain unity within the patriotic forces" in order to foil the "schemes" of the imperialists and reactionaries.

As was the case with the March 1974 visit by the SED delegation, the Pathet Lao accounts of the talks held between the two sides did not reveal whether post-war aid was discussed, and Shibayev's remarks contained only general expressions of support. The joint Soviet-Lao communique, signed on the 12th and broadcast by Radio Pathet Lao on the 13th, included standard references to Soviet-Lao friendship and solidarity and the customary homage to the Vientiane agreement and the NPCC's 18-point program. Soviet media are not known to have reported the delegation's visit.

Shibayev's delegation departed on the 12th for brief stopovers in Luang Prabang and Vientiane. In Luang Prabang Shibayev had a "cordial" chat with NPCC President Souphanouvong, met with LPF Central Committee General Secretary Vongvichit, and had an audience with PGNU Prime Minister Souvanna Phouma.

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## MIDDLE EAST

## USSR HITS "DANGEROUS" U.S. PLANS TO USE MILITARY BASE IN OMAN

Soviet media have been prompt to denounce recently disclosed U.S. plans to acquire aircraft landing rights on the British base of al-Masirah, an island owned by Oman and located off its north-eastern coast. Soviet comment in general has depicted Washington's request as part of a broad U.S. strategy to expand its military presence in the Indian Ocean and Persian Gulf region and exert military and psychological pressures on individual Arab states. Contesting statements by U.S. spokesmen that no military operations would be undertaken from al-Masirah, Moscow has stressed the military capabilities of the base and has charged it will form part of a vast strategic system of U.S. military strongholds from the Middle East to Southeast Asia. At the same time, Moscow has again denied recurrent Western press reports that the Soviet Union has itself acquired military base rights from South Yemen, Iraq, and Somalia.

U.S. "THREATS" Throughout its comment, Moscow has sought to fit the issue of U.S. base rights on al-Masirah into a larger strategic pattern of alleged U.S. attempts to intimidate the Arab oil-producers. TASS English on the 21st, in the first Soviet pickup of official U.S. confirmation--through a Pentagon spokesman on the 20th--that negotiations on base rights were under way with Britain and Oman, placed its terse report on the issue in the context of Secretary Kissinger's recent statement, as TASS put it, "about the possibility of using armed forces against the Middle East oil-producing countries under certain conditions." Subsequent comment has expanded on this theme, stressing the strategic location of al-Masirah near the Persian Gulf oil regions and the existence of military facilities on the base to handle modern fighter, transport, and reconnaissance aircraft. A Moscow radio commentary by Aleksandr Timoshkin in Arabic on the 24th typified much of the comment in charging that the al-Masirah development provided evidence that the Arab oil-producers were being confronted by U.S. "political blackmail and military threats." Similarly, a RED STAR article on the 26th charged that the U.S. "dangerous plans" to acquire base rights on al-Masirah were consistent with previous "threats" against the Arabs.

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DHOFAR  
INTERVENTION

Some Soviet comment, for the most part citing accusations from Arab media, has accused the United States of intending to use al-Masirah to intervene in the guerrilla war in Oman's southern province of Dhofar. A PRAVDA article by Oleg Skalkin on the 24th, for example, charged that a U.S. base on al-Masirah would fulfill a "local purpose" vis-a-vis the Arab oil-producers and play a "more substantial role" by helping to fill out a U.S. "military arc" from Taiwan, through Diego Garcia in the Indian Ocean, to Oman and the entrance to the Persian Gulf. In addition, Skalkin asserted that it "may be used for suppressing the national liberation movement in Dhofar, with which the Sultan cannot cope acting all by himself." Moscow's "unofficial" Radio Peace and Progress in Arabic on the 28th cited a statement by South Yemen's foreign ministry which made similar charges, asserting that the United States and Oman had reached agreement on the U.S. use of al-Masirah "with the aim of suppressing the revolution in Oman," as well as "taking over the Arabian Gulf countries' oil resources."

U.S.-OMANI  
AGREEMENT

Soviet media have, however, shown some confusion in assessing the precise nature of the U.S. request concerning al-Masirah and the state of subsequent negotiations on the issue. In its initial comment, from 20 to 23 January, Moscow primarily replayed a report in Beirut's AS-SAFIR to the effect that the United States and Oman had signed a "secret military agreement" during the Omani Sultan's 9-11 January visit to Washington. Some comment also claimed that the Omani Government had granted the United States base rights on al-Masirah in exchange for military weapons and "specialists" to support the war against the Dhofar rebels--the "Popular Front for the Liberation of Oman." While apparently reluctant to drop the AS-SAFIR story, Moscow subsequently--following remarks on the al-Masirah issue by the White House press secretary on the 22d--has generally been careful to note that negotiations are continuing and that the U.S. request concerned aircraft landing rights rather than substantial base rights.

A Moscow radio commentary by Dmitriy Andreyev, broadcast in English to Great Britain on the 25th, took both tacks in noting that although some media reports had said a U.S.-Omani agreement had been signed, official U.S. and British statements indicated that the issue of U.S. base rights on al-Masirah was still under discussion. Andreyev observed that the Omani Sultan might be "waiting for Britain's reaction" but, as in most other Soviet comment, also suggested that a U.S.-Omani and British agreement, if not already secretly achieved,

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was probably a foregone conclusion. However, a London-dated TASS report by Philip Cutler on the 28th, noting Prime Minister Wilson and Foreign Secretary Callaghan's departure that day for Ottawa and Washington, predicted that the United States and Britain would continue to differ over approaches to meet the world energy crisis and implied in this context that Britain's favorable consideration of the U.S. request regarding al-Masirah would be inconsistent with current British policy of "seeking agreements" with the Arab oil-producers.

The Andreyev commentary on the 25th was also notable for its observation that "the Americans would like to play down the issue." Andreyev explained that U.S. spokesmen had specified that the base rights requested were only for "occasional or emergency landing." Some Soviet comment, such as a TASS English commentary by Sergey Bulantsev on the 23d, has played on the word "emergency," implying that it could go beyond the definition of an aircraft in difficulty and citing recent U.S. leaders' statements on the possible use of military force against the Arab oil-producers "in case of emergency." Similarly, a RED STAR article on the 26th cited a Washington POST report that opinion appeared divided over whether the al-Masirah base would be used by the United States only under "extraordinary circumstances" or whether it had "broader purposes."

SOVIET While denouncing alleged U.S. "imperialistic" strategy  
BASES in the Persian Gulf and Indian Ocean region, Soviet media have refrained from suggesting how Moscow would respond to a given contingency. Soviet comment has reacted in typical defensive fashion, however, to renewed reports in Western media that the Soviet Union has itself enjoyed military base rights for some time in South Yemen, Iraq, and Somalia. A Moscow radio commentary in Arabic on the 28th, for example, labeled the reports "fabrications" and complained that they only compel the Arab states named to issue formal denials of the "imperialistic propaganda." Citing the London DAILY TELEGRAPH as a particular example, the broadcast described the paper's "lie about Soviet bases" as an attempt to detract Arab attention from the danger of actual British-American bases in the Mideast. A Bulantsev TASS commentary on the 27th also denounced the DAILY TELEGRAPH for its article on "Russian expansion" in the Indian Ocean and Persian Gulf region, accusing the paper of "scaring the readers with mythical Soviet bases" to justify the projected "escalation of an American military presence" in the same region through U.S. use of the al-Masirah base.

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## COMMUNIST RELATIONS

## MOSCOW, ALLIES RENEW PRESSURE FOR WORLD PARTY CONFERENCE

Moscow and its orthodox East European allies have resumed their publicly expressed support for a world conference of communist parties after they had earlier softpedaled this issue in apparent deference to the independently oriented parties. Following meetings held in Warsaw and Budapest in October and December of last year to prepare for an all-European communist party conference--planned for East Berlin later this year--Moscow and its allies had avoided the issue of a world party conference, viewed with disfavor by the independent-minded Yugoslav and Romanian parties.\* At the 1974 preparatory meetings, the Yugoslav delegate had in effect ruled out any repetition of past history, in which the 1967 Karlovy Vary conference of European CP's had been followed two years later by the 1969 world party conference in Moscow. And the Romanian delegate had served notice at Warsaw and Budapest that his party would boycott any international conference used as a forum for censure of "absent" communist parties. The new Soviet bloc calls for a world conference amount to a tacit acknowledgment that differences with the independents on this issue may be irreconcilable.

In now renewing public support for a world conference, Moscow has reverted to the practice it had followed prior to the October meeting in Warsaw of merely indicating agreement with and support for what it portrays as a rising tide of proposals for a world gathering by foreign communist parties--registered most recently by the parties of Czechoslovakia and Bulgaria. Thus a talk by PRAVDA political commentator Korionov, broadcast by Moscow radio on 22 January, followed up an appeal for a rebuff to Maoism with the observation that

many fraternal parties nowadays suggest further collective steps aimed at a further ideopolitical consolidation of the communist movement . . . . As has been noted at the plenums of the CPSU Central Committee, our party is prepared to support appropriate constructive initiatives and, together with other Marxist-Leninist parties, to participate in their implementation in practice.

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\* The Warsaw and Budapest meetings are discussed in the TRENDS of 23 October and 24 December 1974, respectively.

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The commentary also recalled that the 24th CPSU Congress had come out in favor of holding further international "conferences," adding--with the independent parties' objections presumably in mind--the CPSU's conviction that such world forums should focus on "constructive" matters.

The recording of support for world conferences in Korionov's 22 January talk takes on added significance in view of the same commentator's silence on this issue in his article, also dealing with communist unity, in PRAVDA of 26 December--five days after the end of the Budapest preparatory meeting.

The still low-keyed character of Moscow's renewed public support for a world party conference is also indicated in Soviet media's selective reporting of the endorsements of such a gathering during the 20-24 January visit by Czechoslovak party leader Husak to Bulgaria. While the 23 January friendship rally speeches by both Husak and Zhivkov and the final communique issued the next day all included such endorsements, Soviet reports of the visit mentioned only the one by Husak: PRAVDA on the 24th noted that the Czechoslovak leader "spoke in favor of convening an international conference of communist and workers parties to assess new phenomena and trends in the world." Soviet media also cited attacks on the Chinese leaders in Husak's speech and the final communique. Zhivkov had uncharacteristically refrained from attacking Peking in his speech at the Sofia rally.

Just prior to the Korionov broadcast and Husak's visit to Bulgaria, Soviet media had completely ignored a 17 January speech by CPCZ Presidium member and secretary Bilak which included a call for the start of preparations for a new world party conference. Moscow's failure to report the speech in Presov by the prominent Czechoslovak party figure is the more noteworthy in view of the fact that the occasion was the 30th anniversary of the Red Army's liberation of this major East Slovak city, and thus the start of the liberation of Czechoslovakia which culminated on 9 May 1945.

Most recently, TASS reports of Ponomarev's speech at a Soviet Army ideological conference in Moscow on the 28th indicate that the CPSU Politburo candidate and secretary registered generalized support for interparty meetings, in addition to an explicit endorsement of the projected European CP conference. The inclusion of strong attacks on the Chinese in both the Ponomarev speech and the 22 January Korionov talk does nothing to dispel the fears of the independent parties that Moscow intends to raise the China issue at the European CP conference as well as at a world party conclave.

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NORDEN ARTICLE ON CHINA      That Moscow will insist that China be an issue at the all-European CP conference was again reflected in a strong anti-Chinese diatribe by one of the GDR's leading ideologues, Politburo member Albert Norden, in the last issue of Moscow's KOMMUNIST for 1974. Norden's article, signed to press on 17 December on the eve of the Budapest meeting, was reprinted reprinted virtually in toto in NEUES DEUTSCHLAND on 8 January. Appropriately entitled "How Maoism Is Struggling Against Peace in Europe," it was clearly a well-timed lecture to all European parties on the dangers of "Maoist" policies for the communist movement in Europe and detente in general. That the article was written by a leading SED spokesman and then reprinted in the East German daily after the Budapest meeting adds to its importance, as the East Germans, hosts for the upcoming conclave, were mandated by the other parties in December to chair the editorial commission which is to draw up documents to be presented at the conference.

The Soviet and East European media have not yet confirmed if there will be another formal meeting before this summer's conference as rumored in the Western press. But Budapest's prominent commentator Ferenc Varnai, responding to a question on Budapest television on the 15th, said that another meeting will be held at the end of January or the beginning of February, without noting whether it will be a meeting of the editorial commission or another formal preparatory session.

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## PRC INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS

## CHINA SEES KEEN RIVALRY IN U.S.-SOVIET MOVES ON TRADE, ARMS

Peking has recently publicized the breakdown of the U.S.-Soviet trade agreement and warnings from high-ranking U.S. officials over Soviet weapons development as evidence for its thesis that super-power rivalry is increasing, a thesis reaffirmed and strengthened by the 4th NPC this month.\* The Chinese comment has portrayed the United States in neutral terms--as a great power which is firmly determined to preserve its interests vis-a-vis its major international adversary--but it has lambasted alleged Soviet double-dealing over the trade deal and over arms limitation agreements with the United States. It has given particular attention to statements by President Ford and Secretaries Kissinger and Schlesinger concerning U.S. resolve to protect U.S. interests and to maintain a firm strategic balance against Moscow. Peking has sharply criticized Moscow's "sell out" of Arab interests over Soviet Jewish emigration and has portrayed the Soviet Union as attempting to use arms limitation discussions with the United States as a cover for growing Soviet weapons development.

TRADE ACCORD Peking's first report that the 1972 U.S.-Soviet trade accord would not be brought into force--a 16 January NCNA report on Secretary Kissinger's 14 January press conference announcing the breakdown--took pains to portray the incident as resulting from a U.S. initiative. NCNA quoted Kissinger as saying that "the U.S. President has decided that the U.S.-USSR trade agreement signed in October 1972 cannot be brought into force" and that the President had decided not to give the Soviet Union most-favored-nation status. NCNA acknowledged that the U.S. action was prompted by the Soviet refusal to accept U.S. Congressional restrictions, but downplayed any suggestion that the USSR was acting out of principle. It recalled previous Soviet "deals" over emigration of Soviet Jews and noted that the Congressional loan ceiling of 300 million dollars was an important factor behind Moscow's action. NCNA tried to give an impression of heightened U.S.-Soviet tensions as a result of the breakdown, carefully replaying Secretary Kissinger's press conference warning of U.S. resolve to resist any Soviet pressure while avoiding reference to the Secretary's accompanying statement on Washington's continuing commitment to detente with the USSR.

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\* For a discussion of NPC foreign policy, see the TRENDS of 22 January 1975, pages 11-14.

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A 14 January NCNA report--released prior to Kissinger's press conference--offered Peking's most comprehensive rebuke in recent years of Soviet attempts to reach a trade agreement with the United States. NCNA portrayed Moscow as anxious to obtain U.S. goods and technology and as willing to engage in "behind-the-scenes deals" in order to achieve favorable trade terms. It pointed particularly to Brezhnev's personal role in fostering Soviet agreement to increase Jewish emigration in order to gain most-favored-nation status, and it charged that recent Soviet media criticism of the 1974 U.S. trade act was designed to cover Soviet embarrassment at being shown to be "a trader in human beings" and a betrayer of the Arab people's cause. Peking has subsequently continued to tie Brezhnev closely to the Soviet agreement on Jewish emigration. A 22 January NCNA report quoted claims by U.S. Senator Jackson on 18 January that Secretary Kissinger had told the Senate Finance Committee that Brezhnev had agreed to accept the Jewish emigration amendment to the U.S. trade act when he met with President Ford in Vladivostok last November.

ARMS RACE        On 18 January NCNA reported Secretary Schlesinger's 14 January press conference statements that the United States had confirmed evidence of Soviet deployment of the SS-18 missile; that there was some indication that Moscow had begun deploying the SS-19--a missile, NCNA noted, that Schlesinger said had an "inherent" MIRV capability; and that these steps were a "potential source" of "strategic imbalance" between the nuclear superpowers. It also cited Schlesinger's warning that Washington may be forced to take countermeasures that would maintain the overall balance in the strategic area. NCNA carefully noted that the Soviet deployments were taking place only two months after Brezhnev had agreed with President Ford on the framework for nuclear arms limitation, and at the very time that Moscow had agreed with Washington to announce the scheduled resumption of the SALT talks in Geneva on 31 January.

On 23 January NCNA reported Schlesinger's 22 January speech at the Economic Club of New York, highlighting his use of a CIA projection which NCNA said showed that the Soviet Union is outspending the United States in overall defense by 20 percent and that Moscow spends 60 percent more than the United States on strategic nuclear arms. NCNA included Schlesinger's warning that a continuation of this trend implies an upsetting of the U.S.-Soviet military equilibrium and his admonition that Washington under the circumstances has "no satisfactory alternative but to continue to maintain the forces necessary to sustain a worldwide military balance."

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Necessary U.S. military preparedness was also the focal point in NCNA's brief 17 January discussion of the foreign affairs section of President Ford's 15 January State of the Union message. It highlighted the President's resolve to keep the United States militarily strong in order to sustain a position of world leadership and to maintain commitments abroad. It concluded that the President's statements meant that the United States will engage in "still fiercer worldwide contention" with the Soviet Union.

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U S S R

## PRAVDA ARTICLE RAISES THEME OF COLLECTIVE LEADERSHIP

The raising of the theme of collective leadership by P. A. Rodionov in an article in the 21 January PRAVDA revives a symbolic instrument of opposition to one-man leadership in the Soviet Union at a time when Brezhnev's authority has become the subject of world-wide speculation. Its symbolic sensitivity in this respect is heightened by the fact that Rodionov, first deputy director of the Institute of Marxism-Leninism, has a well-established reputation as a champion of collective leadership and as an earlier Brezhnev antagonist. In recent months, references to collective leadership have been both rare and brief and have usually been accompanied by statements asserting Brezhnev's predominance.

The symbolic implications of the Rodionov article, however, are diminished by the fact that it is relatively bland in language and, unlike many of his earlier articles, contains no formulations that are clearly directed against Brezhnev. Determining the significance of the article is made more difficult by the fact that the press continues to heap praise on Brezhnev, calling him head of the Politburo, and identifying him as the primary initiator and executor of national policy.

Although Rodionov's PRAVDA article, entitled "Leninist Style of Party Work," discussed several subjects, including the scientific approach to decisionmaking, businesslike leadership, a party approach to economic administration, and checking on plan fulfillment, the theme of collectivity was not treated cursorily but rather was the subject of several paragraphs. Rodionov declared that "the strength of party leadership is in its collectivity," which prevents "subjective decisions," facilitates carefully worked out policies, and insures unity. Nevertheless, Rodionov also cited the need for "individual responsibility and individual direction"--a concept usually invoked as a warning against the diffusion of responsibility inherent in excessive collectivity. Furthermore, the statements in the PRAVDA article were nowhere near as pointed as Rodionov's formulations usually are.

During the late 1960's, Rodionov was the most prolific writer on collectivity and stressed the rights of the collective as against the primacy of the leader, an implicitly anti-Brezhnev bias. In an October 1966 QUESTIONS OF CPSU HISTORY article he cited Lenin's example in submitting to the will of the collective and

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in rebuking anyone who suggested that Lenin could speak in the name of the Central Committee or party. In a December 1967 KOMMUNIST article on intraparty democracy, he declared that no leader has enough experience and knowledge to substitute for the collective. In a 2 August 1969 PRAVDA article on collegiality in party committees and bureaus, he assailed first secretaries who infringe on the rights of the collective and who think collectivity means having the other bureau members approve everything he says. In an April 1970 QUESTIONS OF CPSU HISTORY article on collectivity, he stressed Lenin's example in not forcing his opinions on the collective.

Apparently as a consequence of his anti-Brezhnev stance, in early 1971 Rodionov was demoted from second secretary of Georgia to the academic post of first deputy director of the Institute of Marxism-Leninism. And at the 1971 CPSU Congress he was dropped from candidate membership in the Central Committee. Thereafter, he authored only occasional, innocuous articles. But in February 1974 his writings reappeared in book form under the title "Collectivity Is a High Principle of Party Leadership."

Rodionov's book asserted that "Lenin saw collectivity as the most reliable means to prevent the rising of a cult of personality and invariably stressed that the authority of the party and its collective leadership organs is immeasurably higher and more important than the authority of an individual leader, no matter what merits he possesses." He said that Lenin "called on members of party collegiums to decisively and unitedly act against the slightest attempt by individuals to usurp power or to escape the influence of the collective." Noting that Lenin "permitted no praise or exalting of his person or actions either at meetings or congresses or in the press," Rodionov refuted the allegations of foes that "a tendency to individual leadership is inherent to communist parties."

RECENT REFERENCES  
TO COLLECTIVITY

Rodionov's book clearly did not reflect the current prevailing line, as the press has increasingly ignored collectivity and stressed Brezhnev's personal dominance. Moreover, the brief mentions of collectivity in recent months have usually been thoroughly diluted by simultaneous statements setting Brezhnev above the collective. For instance, on 24 June 1974 Podgornyy, while presenting an Order of Lenin to Andropov, referred to "our collective leadership headed by General Secretary L. I. Brezhnev." A 15 August 1974 IZVESTIYA editorial cited collectivity, but only in the context of stressing the importance of "combining

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collective leadership with personal responsibility." At the 2 November 1974 Kirgiz anniversary ceremony, Kirgiz First Secretary Usubaliyev, according to the local paper, declared that the work of the Politburo "is characterized by collectivity of leadership," but he also repeatedly called Brezhnev head of the Politburo and he conferred on Kosygin the title of "a very close comrade-in-arms" of Brezhnev. Kazakh First Secretary Kunayev in a 20 November Kazakhstan speech cited collectivity, but also referred to the Politburo headed by Brezhnev. KOMMUNIST chief editor V. G. Afanasyev in a November 1974 article in his journal cited Lenin on the need for a "necessary minimum of collegiality," while leaving the final decision to "one leader-- a comrade known for his firmness, decisiveness, boldness, ability to handle practical matters, and enjoying the most confidence." Perhaps the height of incongruity was achieved by Kirilenko, who in a speech at a Bucharest factory in November 1974, while attending the Romanian party congress, said that the Politburo "headed by" Brezhnev "shows constant concern about the strict observance of Leninist norms of party and state life and the principle of collective leadership."

There have been only a handful of references which have not been accompanied by this stress on Brezhnev's primary role. On 16 October 1974, while receiving an award from Bulgarian First Secretary Zhivkov, Suslov referred to himself as "a member of the collective leadership of the CPSU." In his articles on the anniversary of the October 1964 plenum in the 15 October 1974 RURAL LIFE and an October 1974 PARTY LIFE, V. Stepanov declared that the plenum had restored collectivity. Rodionov also mentioned collectivity in an October 1974 POLITICAL SELF-EDUCATION article.

Unlike the current Rodionov article, most recent theoretical articles--such as the PRAVDA and IZVESTIYA editorials on the anniversary of the October 1964 plenum--have ignored collectivity and focused on Brezhnev. The formulation Politburo "headed by" Brezhnev continues to appear very frequently in the central press--on 14 days in the three weeks ending 25 January--and Brezhnev continues to be obsequiously treated in speeches and at meetings. The most recent examples being a 10 January Komsomol plenum and a 15 January trade union council plenum. Other leaders continue to pay obeisance to Brezhnev. Thus, Moscow First Secretary and Politburo member Grishin, visiting Poland in mid-January, brought personal greetings from Brezhnev and referred to Brezhnev and Gierek as the "leaders" (rukovoditeli) of their parties and countries, while Podgornyy on 24 January again referred to Brezhnev as head of the Politburo.

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## COLLECTION OF KOSYGIN SPEECHES CONTAINS SOME NEW MATERIAL

The contents of the recently issued collection of Kosygin speeches and articles fails to answer the question of why the Soviet premier has been honored by this unusual publication. Apart from Brezhnev, heretofore only Suslov has been so honored and his collection was clearly pegged to his 70th birthday. Kosygin's by contrast, was issued some six months after his 70th birthday and there is no other protocolary consideration that would explain the publication. The book contains some previously unpublished speeches by the Soviet premier, but omits many of his more important public ones. Among the newly revealed speeches is a remarkably frank 1964 address to the Central Committee Institute of Social Sciences--an organization rarely mentioned--which argued for more trade with the West.

A possible clue to the timing of the book may be afforded by the publication data. The book was set in print on 23 July 1974 and signed to the press on 20 August, a schedule which would suggest that the decision to compile the book must have been taken sometime in the spring of 1974. This was a period when Kosygin's influence was apparently strong in the leadership, since two important decisions promoting policies which he had long advocated were issued at that time. The first was the 22 April Council of Ministers decree extending the 1965 "direct ties" experiment throughout light industry, and the second was the extension of the new planning system adopted by the Moscow Motor Transport Administration in 1965 to other motor transport organizations.\*

The book was issued in 200,000 copies--roughly similar to the handling of collections of Brezhnev speeches, most of which have appeared in 200-300,000 copies. Just as various Brezhnev assistants were credited with preparing the collections of his speeches, the Kosygin publications identified his assistants A. G. Karpov and B. T. Batsanov as "responsible for issuing."

SECRET SPEECH      Less than half of Kosygin's significant speeches since becoming premier were selected for this collection. Among those omitted were an 18 July 1965 Riga speech, in which he attacked anti-Semitism; his 1966, 1967, 1970 and 1971 Supreme Soviet election speeches; his 14 February 1968 Minsk speech urging use of computers and foreign technology; and his 13 November 1973 Minsk speech admitting that Soviet fuel reserves were tight.

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\* See the TRENDS of 17 July 1974, pages 21-23.

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On the other hand, the collection includes a secret 3 July 1964 speech to the Institute of Social Sciences, which presented this select audience of foreign affairs specialists with a remarkably frank discussion of Soviet trade relations with the West. Kosygin's advocacy of developing foreign economic ties was stronger in this private speech than in his public statements during this period. He explained in detail the great opportunities for the USSR to sell oil and gas to increasingly energy-short West Europe and also the great value in developing foreign trade and scientific-technological exchange with all countries, especially the United States. Citing observations that he had made during foreign visits, he argued that even small countries have something to offer to the Soviet Union. At the same time, he bitterly complained that big capitalist countries still underestimate the Soviet economy and have little interest in trade. Observing that the United States is the only country which is not developing economic relations with the Soviet Union, he said this resulted from ignorance. To document this claim he quoted the then Secretary of State Rusk as asking him what the USSR could trade except vodka and caviar?

LAUDATORY REVIEWS IN  
IZVESTIYA, KOMMUNIST

The Kosygin book was reviewed in an unsigned PRAVDA article on 20 October and an IZVESTIYA article on 24 October, as well as in KOMMUNIST in October, PARTY LIFE in December, and the January PLANNED ECONOMY. The reviews in IZVESTIYA and KOMMUNIST were most enthusiastic about Kosygin's views. Writing in IZVESTIYA Academician A. Yefimov was unusually laudatory. The reviewer declared that Kosygin treated various spheres of activity of the party and state "convincingly and brilliantly." And he referred to the premier's "many years" of experience in state and economic leadership and his "profound and economic erudition." Yefimov, as deputy academic secretary of the Academy of Sciences' economic division and as director of Gosplan's economic institute since 1955, has clearly had frequent contact with Kosygin.

The unsigned KOMMUNIST review lauded Kosygin's 1965 economic reform and backed his longtime drive for more trade with the West with the statement that "attempts at self-isolation by any state and disregard of the achievements of science and culture of other countries lead to failures in the economy, impoverishment of spiritual life, and loss of a feeling of reality in politics." The PLANNED ECONOMY review praised the 1965 reform and Kosygin's "big contribution" to planning, administration, and the use of economic levers.

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## AGRICULTURE MINISTRY GRUDGINGLY APPROVES LINK SYSTEM

After long years of sharp prodding, the Agriculture Ministry has finally produced a guarded and grudging endorsement of the mechanized link form of farm labor organization. Although the ministry has been studying the link system for several years and, according to a 10 June 1973 PRAVDA article, was supposed to have issued recommendations as early as 1971, ministry officials have dragged their feet and still in late 1974 appeared to be encouraging sniping at links.\*

The ministry's decision is revealed in the January ECONOMICS OF AGRICULTURE account of a recent meeting of the ministry's collegium to discuss the work of agricultural organs in Krym and Dnepropetrovsk oblasts on improving forms of labor organization. According to the agricultural journal, the collegium approved an expository letter prepared by the Agriculture Ministry's administration for labor organization, norms and wages and ordered it sent to lower organs. The letter declared that study has shown complex mechanized links using pay based on final results with wage advances to be an "effective form of labor organization," and it cited their numerous advantages. However, the letter appeared not to take the form of an instruction but rather looked more like a detailed study of experiences with the mechanized link system.

The journal's account of the collegium was written by V. Zhurikov, chief of the Agriculture Ministry administration which prepared the letter and himself a past foe of links. The 10 June 1973 PRAVDA article had accused him by name of delaying the recommendations on links and subsequently, in response to the PRAVDA attack, a deputy minister promised that the recommendations would be completed and issued shortly. In his present account, Zhurikov mentions that these recommendations were in fact prepared in 1973 but he fails to explain what was done with them. They were not publicized, and Zhurikov subsequently repeated his reservations on links in a December 1973 ECONOMICS OF AGRICULTURE article.

Although Zhurikov's account of the collegium meeting is fairly long, it makes no mention of Agriculture Minister Polyanskiy's presence, suggesting once again Polyanskiy's unwillingness to associate himself with the link system. Further qualifying the ministry's endorsement is the evident distaste for links so apparent in the letter. Thus instead of selecting the oblasts and farms receiving

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\* See the TRENDS of 20 November 1974, pages 22-23.

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national attention for their link experience, the ministry picked out two oblasts in the Ukraine--where enthusiasm for these kinds of links has been lower than in other areas.\* Apparently Polyanskiy did not wish to raise as examples the links in Volgograd, Krasnodar and elsewhere touted by his longtime foes.

In addition, the Ukrainian links singled out by the ministry may be larger than the more-advertised links, reflecting ministry dislike for the small-unit character of most links. Nikolayev Obkom Secretary V. Vednikov wrote in the 24 March 1974 RURAL LIFE that his oblast had first copied Krasnodar farmer Pervitskiy's mechanized links, but found them too small and switched to Krym experience, creating big mechanized links.

Further, while Krym agricultural officials are criticized by the ministry decision for not encouraging links, Dnepropetrovsk is criticized for forcing the creation of too many links. The ministry's endorsement also included the warning that conditions throughout the Soviet Union vary and no one form of organization can be recommended for all farms. This is an objection often raised by Zhurikov and other link foes in the past. Hence, the letter of information also endorsed specialized links, various kinds of brigades and mechanized units and specifically urged that mechanized brigades be encouraged too. On the other hand, the "unregulated" type mechanized link--where work assignments are not handed out--is not endorsed by name.

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\* The Ukraine has preferred specialized links--for beets, corn, sunflowers and other special crops--rather than the more controversial general field links.

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## YUGOSLAVIA

## BELGRADE PHILOSOPHY PROFESSORS PURGED; CRITICISM ANTICIPATED

Belgrade has demonstrated its intention to crack down on internal dissent by ousting eight nonconformist philosophy professors at Belgrade University. Tito and the communist party had endured their criticisms since 1968 and had tried to have them purged a year ago. The 28 January dismissals, approved by the Serbian Assembly and reported by TANJUG, were not unexpected, having been preceded by the passage of a new law specially designed to enable the government to remove the professors, the initiation of a bitter press campaign against them and the 24 January resignation of the philosophy faculty's dean, who had supported the professors.\* Media comment on the dismissals has been particularly defensive; VECERNJE NOVOSTI, according to TANJUG on the 28th, for example, conceded that the assembly action was "extraordinary and specific, but necessary."

The assembly's decision accused the Marxist professors of using their academic positions and a facade of false theoretical statements about communism for staging "political opposition" against the regime, including advocacy of a multi-party system and the "aim of violent change." In an apparent effort to discredit the professors' charges of Stalinism against the party leadership, the assembly accused them of using Stalinist methods themselves to oust professors loyal to the regime. The assembly also discounted strong intellectual and student support for the professors in portraying them as an "isolated group" and not part of "any new left wing." The professors' opposition to the regime had come into prominence during the 1968 student revolts, and when the party threatened to oust them a year ago, the university's 800 philosophy students vowed to strike and shut down part of the university.

Officials also revealed apprehension that intellectuals in the West will portray the purge as an attack on academic freedom in Yugoslavia--as had happened last year. Accusations from "some foreign countries" that the government was guilty of "persecution" and "gross meddling" in university affairs were turned aside as "quite ill-intentioned and very tendentious." Officials also maintained that academic freedom is stronger in Yugoslavia than it

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\* For background, see the TRENDS of 15 January 1975, pages 26-27.

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is "in the states from which such words of blame emanate." Earlier media comment had referred specifically to the United States as well as to several West European states. As a possible sop to critics, TANJUG noted that the professors will receive financial compensation.

The regime's sensitivity to criticism of its suppression of dissent is heightened by the fact that prominent writer Mihajlo Mihajlov was to have gone on trial 27 January on charges of hostile activity and spreading hostile propaganda. Mihajlov, whose case has not been publicized in the Yugoslav media, was arrested last October after writing articles critical of the Soviet Union which appeared in U.S. and Russian emigre publications. Western intellectuals and Milovan Djilas have protested his arrest.

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## URUGUAY

## USSR WELCOMES RELEASED CP LEADER ARISMENDI, CRITICIZES REGIME

Soviet media have given considerable attention to Rodney Arismendi, First Secretary of the Uruguayan Communist Party (PCU), since his release from prison in Montevideo and arrival in Moscow on 6 January. Moscow, which has denounced as authoritarian the regime established in Uruguay in June, 1973, has highlighted Arismendi's criticisms of the regime and his effusive praise of the PCU, the Soviet Union, and the "powerful movement of solidarity" which forced the government to "retreat and release" him.

**TREATMENT OF REGIME** Although condemnation of Uruguay has not been as frequent and severe as that regularly meted out to the Chilean regime, the major actions of President Juan Bordaberry's military-dominated government have been regular targets of Soviet criticism. PRAVDA, in deploring the November 1973 ban placed on the PCU, asserted on 5 December 1973 that "the Black Hundreds have never succeeded" in crushing communist determination and predicted that Uruguay's communists would "fight until victory" was achieved over the "rightist forces." The May 1974 arrest of Arismendi, long-time leader of the pro-Soviet PCU, was denounced by the PCU--in a statement replayed by TASS on 14 May--as an attempt to "decapitate the resistance movement," and a Moscow-sponsored solidarity movement was organized on behalf of Arismendi and other imprisoned leftists. Moscow's annoyance at Montevideo's stand against Cuba at the Quito OAS conference last November may have promoted the flurry of comment about that time. For example, ZA RUBEZHOM on 24 November berated the Uruguayan regime as a "lackey and diehard champion" of the "most reactionary U.S. circles."

**PRAISE OF ARISMENDI** Giving a warm welcome to Arismeni, Moscow has honored him with the award of the Order of the October Revolution and publicized his statements in a press conference and television interviews. Presenting the award in a ceremony on 24 January, President Podgornyy declared that Arismendi's "whole life and activity" had been a "wonderful example" of service to Uruguay and to "proletarian internationalism." Soviet media have taken the occasion of Arismendi's arrival to underline the theme of inevitable success of liberation movements in Latin America. Hailing Arismendi's arrival, PRAVDA said on the

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12th that his release proved that authoritarian forces were involved in a "futile attempt" to reverse the liberation of Latin America and expressed continued faith in the "mighty campaign" of solidarity through which the socialist community aided the liberation movements.

Arismendi's public statements in Moscow have emphasized the "vanguard" role of the PCU and the Soviet Union. Speaking at a press conference reported by TASS on the 16th, he said that the PCU "was and still is" the "vanguard of the antidictatorial struggle" against reactionary forces within Uruguay and he also noted the "tremendous positive impact" of Soviet policies on "the struggle of the Latin American peoples for their liberation."

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## NOTE

SINO-U.S. RELATIONS: NCNA on 27 January revealed President Ford's letter of congratulations to Chou En-lai on his recent reappointment as premier. The press agency noted that the President said he looked forward to meeting with Chou later this year and that he expressed hope that "through common efforts" the two sides could overcome their "fundamental differences," "advance the cause of normalizing Sino-U.S. relations, and thus fulfill the joint commitment expressed in the Shanghai communique of 1972". The report represents the first time Peking has reported a formal U.S. Presidential message to a Chinese leader since the thaw in relations in 1971, and it marks Peking's most positive replay of President Ford's remarks on U.S.-China relations to date. Peking had heretofore limited its coverage of President's Ford's discussions of Sino-U.S. relations to a few references to his generalized support for the principles of the Shanghai communique.

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# APPENDIX

## MOSCOW, PEKING BROADCAST STATISTICS 20 - 26 JANUARY 1975

<u>Moscow (2465 items)</u>			<u>Peking (783 items)</u>		
China	(5%)	9%	Fourth National	(23%)	57%
[Fourth National	(--)	3%]	People's Congress		
People's Congress			[Foreign Greetings	(--)	4%]
U.S. Trade Law	(--)	4%	Angola Independence	(--)	4%
Foreign Ministry Pro-	(--)	3%	Nordic "Marxist-Len-	(--)	2%
test to U.S. over UN			inist" Parties Con-		
Shooting Incident			ference, Stockholm		
CEMA Executive Commit-	(--)	3%	Indochina	(4%)	2%
tee Meeting, Moscow					
Lenin Death Anniver-	(--)	3%			
sary					

These statistics are based on the voicecast commentary output of the Moscow and Peking domestic and international radio services. The term "commentary" is used to denote the lengthy item—radio talk, speech, press article or editorial, government or party statement, or diplomatic note. Items of extensive reportage are counted as commentaries.

Figures in parentheses indicate volume of comment during the preceding week.

Topics and events given major attention in terms of volume are not always discussed in the body of the Trends. Some may have been covered in prior issues; in other cases the propaganda content may be routine or of minor significance.